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I. INTRODUCTION 
Washington’s application of the collateral source rule permits re-
covery for medical expenses that were never incurred and have no rela-
tionship to their market value. This application is set forth in Hayes v. 
Wieber Enterprises, Inc., where the plaintiff sued a restaurant for injuries 
she sustained from falling down the restaurant’s basement stairs.1 At tri-
al, the plaintiff introduced evidence that her physician billed $5,800 for 
medical services even though he had accepted $3,300 from her health 
insurer as payment in full.2 The trial court refused to admit evidence that 
her physician had accepted $3,300 as payment in full because the $3,300 
was from a collateral source.3 Accordingly, the plaintiff was allowed to 
recover the $1,500 “written off” by her physician. 
The court of appeals affirmed, holding the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion when it refused to admit evidence the physician had accept-
ed $3,300 as payment in full.4 The court, however, did not address 
whether evidence the physician had accepted the $3,300 as payment in 
full was barred by the collateral source rule.5 Instead, the court relied on 
the physician’s testimony that his $5,800 bill was reasonable and that the 
defendant did not present testimony the bill was unreasonable.6 The ap-
pellate court, therefore, having decided the case on an evidentiary issue, 
did not disturb the trial court’s application of the collateral source rule. 
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The collateral source rule is set forth in the Restatement Second of 
Torts: “Payments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from 
other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although 
they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.”7 
The collateral source rule is also set forth in the Washington Practice 
Series (WAPRAC) § 6.35: “Under the collateral source rule, a tortfeasor 
may not reduce damages, otherwise recoverable, to reflect payments re-
ceived by a plaintiff from a collateral source. A collateral source is a 
source independent of one of the tortfeasors.”8 WAPRAC notes the ma-
jority of cases applying the collateral source rule in Washington are cases 
in which the collateral payment consisted of Medicare benefits; social 
security and veterans’ pension benefits; disability pension benefits; 
workers’ compensation benefits; unemployment compensation benefits; 
or where a plaintiff received payments from his insurer covered all or 
part of the loss.9 
The reasoning behind the collateral source rule is to ensure justice 
and deterrence. When a tortfeasor is not obliged to correct the wrong she 
caused, then the victim never receives what is due from the tortfeasor—
justice. The collateral source rule, therefore, ensures that a tortfeasor ful-
ly pays for the damages he commits. The collateral source rule is also 
necessary to preserve the deterrence function of tort law by not allowing 
a tortfeasor to avoid liability because a plaintiff had the foresight to pur-
chase insurance. Whether because of justice or deterrence, at common 
law the collateral source rule makes certain that a jury will not reduce a 
plaintiff’s award because he received compensation from a third party. 
Why should the collateral source rule compel the defendant in 
Hayes to pay the original amount billed, $5,800, when the physician ac-
cepted $3,300 as payment in full? Is not $3,300 the reasonable or market 
value of the medical services provided to the plaintiff? This Comment 
discusses whether Washington should amend its application of the col-
lateral source rule to disallow the recovery of write-offs and whether the 
amount accepted as payment in full by a medical provider is the reasona-
ble or market value of the services provided. Part II of this Comment 
explores the collateral source rule and the development of the “reasona-
ble and necessary” requirement in Washington. Part III discusses the im-
pact of the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Howell v. 
Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. and its progeny.10 Part IV explores 
the resurgence of tort reform throughout the country while providing an 
                                                        
 7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2). 
 8. 16 WASH. PRAC., TORT LAW AND PRACTICE § 6:35 (3d ed). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2011). 
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assessment of other state court rulings on write-offs including the issues 
of subrogation and contractual agreements. Part V concludes with why 
Washington should revisit the issues raised in Hayes v. Wieber Enter-
prises, Inc. and no longer permit the amount written off to be inadmissi-
ble under the collateral source rule. 
II. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
“REASONABLE AND NECESSARY” IN WASHINGTON 
A 1913 civil suit involving injuries sustained by a police officer is 
the earliest Washington State case that discusses the collateral source 
rule.11 In Heath v. Seattle Taxicab Co., the plaintiff police officer wit-
nessed a cab driving south on Fremont Avenue at a high speed.12 When 
the cab was within about seventy-five feet of him, the officer stepped in 
the street on Fremont Avenue and signaled to the cab to stop, intending 
to arrest the driver.13 Instead of stopping, the driver of the cab increased 
its speed, hitting the plaintiff.14 The evidence showed that the police of-
ficer suffered a partial dislocation of the right shoulder, an injury to the 
right knee, and that his back was severely bruised.15 
Prior to the accident, the police officer had contributed 1.5% of his 
monthly income to the police pension fund provided by the Police Pen-
sion Act.16 The taxicab company argued that the trial court erred by re-
fusing to give the following instruction: 
[I]f you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was reimbursed 
from his lost wages out of the police pension fund of the city of Se-
attle and was reimbursed, wholly or in part, for his hospital and 
medical bills, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the sums 
for which he has been reimbursed out of said fund, and you shall al-
low plaintiff only such sums as he actually lost by reason of loss of 
time and wages and hospital and medical services.17 
The Washington State Supreme Court held there was no error in this re-
fusal.18 
The Heath court explained that the pension fund was no different in 
principle from ordinary accident insurance where a person is reimbursed 
                                                        
 11. Heath v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 131 P. 843 (Wash. 1913). 
 12. Id. at 844. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 847. 
 16. Id. at 846. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 187. 
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by an insurance company.19 A person reimbursed by an insurance com-
pany for his loss of time and expenses caused by his injury is not pre-
cluded from maintaining an action for those same items against the per-
son who caused the injury.20 The court stated that it would be 
contrary to public policy and shocking to the sense of justice to hold 
that the proceeds of insurance paid for by the injured person for his 
benefit . . . should inure to the benefit of and grant immunity to the 
person whose negligence, willful or otherwise, injured him or 
caused his death.21 
This rule was reaffirmed in Engstrom v. City of Seattle, where city 
employee Mr. Oscar Engstrom was injured while working on the streets 
and sewer system.22 His injury was caused by the negligence of the Puget 
Sound Electric Railway Company.23 Due to his injury, Mr. Engstrom was 
incapacitated for a period of thirteen months and subsequently recovered 
$4,000 from the railway company on the account of his injuries and for 
loss of time.24 However, article 16, § 32 of the Seattle City Charter con-
tained a provision that stated, “Any person in the service of the city un-
der civil service appointment who shall be disabled in the discharge of 
his duties, shall receive full pay during such disability not to exceed thir-
ty days, and half pay not to exceed six months . . . .”25 Mr. Engstrom 
consequently brought an action against the city to recover the $288 due 
from the charter provision.26 The Washington State Supreme Court re-
versed the lower court’s opinion relying on the arguments set forth in 
Heath.27 The court held that even though Mr. Engstrom collected damag-
es from the railway company, it did not relieve the city from reimbursing 
Mr. Engstrom for his injuries or complying with its employment con-
tract.28 
The collateral source rule was also applied in Stone v. City of Seat-
tle, where the plaintiff was injured when he fell into a hole on a public 
sidewalk in front of an apartment building.29 The plaintiff brought an 
action against the city and the owner of the apartment complex for negli-
                                                        
 19. Id. at 186. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Engstrom v. City of Seattle, 159 P. 816 (Wash. 1916). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 817. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Stone v. City of Seattle, 391 P.2d 179, 180 (Wash. 1964). 
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gently failing to maintain the sidewalk.30 The trial court’s instructions to 
the jury mentioned that the plaintiff was collecting social security bene-
fits at the time of the accident, and on review, the Washington State Su-
preme Court stated, 
It is well established that the fact a plaintiff receives, from a collat-
eral source, payments of this nature which have a tendency to miti-
gate the consequences of the injury that he otherwise would have 
suffered, may not be taken into consideration when assessing the 
damages that the defendant must pay.31 
The Washington State Supreme Court reversed because of the trial 
court’s error with the jury instructions, stating that the social security 
benefits should have had no bearing on the jury deliberation.32 
In Ciminksi v. SCI Corp., the plaintiff fell in the defendant’s restau-
rant and sustained severe hip injuries.33 The jury returned a verdict of 
$79,000, which included $14,000 paid by Medicare under the plaintiff’s 
Part A coverage.34 The defendant moved to reduce the verdict by the 
amount paid by Medicare, but the trial court denied the motion on the 
grounds that the payments were from a collateral source.35 The defendant 
appealed the denial and the Washington State Supreme Court granted 
review.36 The appellant argued that the collateral source rule applies only 
to benefits that the plaintiff “has previously extended consideration,” 
such as health insurance.37 The appellant contended that because the re-
spondent’s wages were not taxed to finance Medicare, she did not pay 
for the Part A coverage, but the appellant was compelled to pay taxes for 
Medicare and thus should not have to pay twice.38 The Washington State 
Supreme Court did not agree and held that the “application of the collat-
eral source rule need not be conditioned on some payment by the plain-
tiff for the benefit received. To so limit the doctrine would be contrary to 
the policy that the wrongdoer should not benefit from collateral pay-
ments made to the person he has wronged.”39 
There are a few exceptions to the collateral source rule in Washing-
ton. First, the collateral source rule does not apply to sources of compen-
                                                        
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 183. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 585 P.2d 1182 (Wash. 1978). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1183. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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sation that are not independent of the tortfeasor.40 In Maziarski v. Bair, 
for example, the plaintiff was riding his bicycle when a car driven by the 
defendant struck him.41 At the time of the accident, the defendant was 
insured by the Hartford Insurance Company, and her policy provided 
both liability coverage and Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverage.42 
The plaintiff incurred medical bills in the amount of $7,753, which Hart-
ford fully paid under the PIP coverage before any determination of fault 
had been made.43 The collateral source rule did not apply because the 
payments at issue came from the defendant’s PIP coverage, which was a 
fund she created and thus not a collateral source.44 
Second, the collateral source rule does not apply if the compensa-
tion is for a different injury.45 In Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese of Se-
attle, the plaintiff started to have problems with her supervisor in April 
1984.46 Then in May 1984, the plaintiff injured her hand while working 
and took a three-month leave to recuperate.47 The plaintiff spent three 
weeks of her three-month leave in an inpatient treatment facility after 
attempting suicide because of her health and problems at work.48 The 
plaintiff subsequently took additional leave for surgeries to repair her 
hand.49 During these absences, the plaintiff received workers’ compensa-
tion benefits.50 After the plaintiff’s job was filled while she was on leave 
for her second surgery, the plaintiff sued her employer for handicap dis-
crimination, among other claims.51 In a pretrial ruling, the trial court 
ruled the employer was not entitled to an offset of the plaintiff’s workers’ 
compensation benefits.52 The jury returned a general verdict of 
$150,000.53 On appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred 
in refusing to offset the plaintiff’s damages award by the amount of her 
workers’ compensation benefits representing replacement for lost wag-
es.54 The Washington State Supreme Court affirmed because the collat-
                                                        
 40. Maziarski v. Bair, 924 P.2d 409 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996). 
 41. Id. at 410. 
 42. Id. at 411. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 413. 
 45. Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese of Seattle, 880 P.2d 29 (Wash. 1994). 
 46. Id. at 30. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 30–31. 
 52. Id. at 31. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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eral source rule had no application where the plaintiff was compensated 
for two different injuries.55 
While the collateral source rule precludes a defendant from intro-
ducing evidence that a plaintiff has already been compensated for her 
injuries, a defendant is only liable for the reasonable value of the medical 
services received by a plaintiff, even if the bills for the medical services 
have been paid in full.56 A plaintiff’s burden to prove the reasonable val-
ue of medical services was set forth in Torgeson v. Hanford, where the 
Washington State Supreme Court held that the trial court erred when it 
submitted the plaintiff’s claims for medical services and hospital fees to 
the jury without evidence of their reasonable value.57 The court stated, 
One who is injured as the plaintiff claims to have been, if entitled to 
recover against the party charged with the negligence which caused 
the injury, is entitled to judgment for his expenses necessarily in-
curred in the treatment of the injuries sustained by him, but he can-
not recover what he may agree to pay the physician for his services, 
because the other party is not bound by such agreement. Under such 
circumstances the injured party must prove what would be reasona-
ble compensation to the physician for the services rendered, and 
would be entitled to recover that amount if he had paid or was liable 
to pay the same.58 
A plaintiff’s burden to prove the reasonable value of medical ser-
vices was affirmed in Patterson v. Horton, where the Washington Court 
of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred in relying on medical bills 
as proof of medical costs without requiring the plaintiff to show that the 
bills were reasonable and that the treatment was necessary.59 The trial 
court adopted the plaintiff’s argument that payment of the bills created a 
presumption that they were reasonable and necessary.60 The court of ap-
peals, however, ruled that medical records and bills are relevant to prove 
past medical expenses only if supported by additional evidence that the 
treatment and bills were both necessary and reasonable.61 The Washing-
ton Pattern Instructions further explain that plaintiffs in negligence cases 
are permitted to recover the reasonable value of the medical services they 
receive—not the total of all bills paid.62 The amount actually billed or 
                                                        
 55. Id. at 32. 
 56. See Torgeson v. Hanford, 139 P. 648 (Wash. 1914); Patterson v. Horton, 929 P.2d 1125 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997). 
 57. Torgeson, 139 P. at 649. 
 58. Id. (quoting Wheeler v. Tyler S. E. R. Co., 43 S.W. 876, 877 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1898)). 
 59. Patterson v. Horton, 929 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). 
 60. Id. at 1130. 
 61. Id. 
 62. 6 WASH. PRAC., WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CIV. WPI 30.07.01 (6th ed.). 
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paid is not determinative; rather, the question is whether the sums re-
quested for medical services are reasonable.63 
The formation of the collateral source rule and the requirement that 
medical bills must be reasonable and necessary culminated in Hayes v. 
Wieber Enterprises, Inc. In Hayes, the plaintiff’s physician billed the 
plaintiff approximately $5,800 for medical services64 and testified at trial 
that the bill was reasonable.65 The plaintiff’s physician, however, had 
accepted approximately $3,300 from the plaintiff’s health insurer as 
payment in full.66 At trial, the defendant sought to question the plaintiff’s 
physician on the difference between the amount he accepted as payment 
for his services and the amount he billed for these same services.67 The 
trial court concluded the difference was a collateral source and refused 
the offered proof on the difference between the amount accepted and the 
amount billed.68 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the $3,300 was the appropriate 
evidence of the market value of the medical care received by the plain-
tiff.69 The defendant also argued that the collateral source rule only ap-
plied to actual amounts paid on the plaintiff’s behalf.70 The court of ap-
peals did not explicitly address the defendant’s arguments; instead, the 
court focused on whether the amount requested by the plaintiff was rea-
sonable: “Plaintiffs in negligence cases are permitted to recover the rea-
sonable value of the medical services they receive, not the total of all 
bills paid. And the amount actually billed or paid is not itself determina-
tive. The question is whether the sums requested for medical services are 
reasonable.”71 
The court’s focus on reasonableness led to the crux of its opinion: 
Wieber could have challenged the reasonableness of Ms. Hayes’ 
medical bills by presenting testimony that the charges were unrea-
sonable. The fact that the doctor accepted the first party insurance 
carrier’s limit for his services does not tend to prove his charge for 
these services was unreasonable. Dr. Oakley testified the bill was 
reasonable. Wieber presented no evidence to the contrary. The trial 
judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to admit evidence that 
                                                        
 63. Id. 
 64. Hayes v. Wieber Enterprises, Inc., 20 P.3d 496, 498 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
 65. Id. at 499. 
 66. Id. at 498. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 498–99. 
 71. Id. at 499. 
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Ms. Hayes’ physician accepted what her insurance company paid, 
as payment in full.72 
The court’s decision, in short, rested on the defendant not calling an 
expert witness to testify that the plaintiff’s physician’s bill was unreason-
able. Given the plaintiff’s physician’s full bill was approximately $5,800 
and he accepted approximately $3,300 from the plaintiff’s health insur-
er as payment in full—a difference of only $1,500—it should come as no 
surprise that the defendant did not hire an expert witness to testify on this 
issue. Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that the collateral source rule 
disallowed testimony of the discrepancy between the amount the plain-
tiff’s physician billed and the amount he actually accepted as payment in 
full.73 If the defendant had retained an expert witness to testify that the 
$3,300 accepted from the plaintiff’s health insurer as payment in full was 
the reasonable or market value of the services provided by the plaintiff’s 
physician, is such testimony barred by the collateral source rule? The 
California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Howell v. Hamilton Meats 
& Provisions, Inc. provides a jurisprudential blueprint for how Washing-
ton could amend its application of the collateral source rule. 
III. THE IMPACT OF HOWELL V. HAMILTON MEATS & PROVISIONS, INC. 
In Howell, the plaintiff was seriously injured in an automobile acci-
dent negligently caused by a driver who was working for the defendant.74 
At trial, the defendant conceded liability and the necessity of the plain-
tiff’s medical treatment, only contesting the amounts of the plaintiff’s 
economic and noneconomic damages.75 
The defendant moved to exclude evidence of medical bills that nei-
ther the plaintiff nor her health insurer, PacifiCare, had paid.76 The de-
fendant’s motion was based on PacifiCare records, which indicated the 
plaintiff’s medical bills had been adjusted downward pursuant to an 
agreement between the medical providers and PacifiCare.77 The agree-
ment also provided that the plaintiff could not be billed for the balance of 
the original bills beyond agreed-upon patient co-payments.78 The trial 
court denied the motion, ruling that the plaintiff could present her full 
                                                        
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2011). 
 75. Id. at 1133. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1133–34. 
 78. Id. at 1134. 
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bills to the jury and any reduction to reflect payment of reduced amounts 
in a post-trial motion.79 
The plaintiff presented testimony that the total amount billed for her 
medical care up to the time of trial was $189,978, and the jury returned a 
verdict awarding the same amount as damages for the plaintiff’s past 
medical expenses.80 The defendant then made a post-trial motion to re-
duce past medical damages, pursuant to Hanif v. Housing Authority of 
Yolo County,81 seeking a reduction of $130,286—the amount assertedly 
written off by the plaintiff’s medical care providers.82 The defendant’s 
motion was supported by two declarations that stated the difference be-
tween the amount billed by the plaintiff’s medical providers and the 
amount accepted by them as payment in full was written off pursuant to 
an agreement between them and the plaintiff’s private healthcare insurer, 
PacifiCare.83 Both declarations stated that the providers had not filed 
liens for, and would not pursue collection of, the written-off amounts.84 
In opposition, the plaintiff argued that the reduction of the medical 
damages would violate the collateral source rule.85 The plaintiff support-
ed her opposition with patient agreements she had signed agreeing to pay 
“usual and customary charges” and any physician’s fee her insurance did 
not pay.86 The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, reducing past 
medical damages to reflect the amount medical providers accepted as 
payment in full.87 The California Court of Appeals reversed the reduction 
order, holding that it violated the collateral source rule.88 The California 
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding 
that an injured person could not recover the amount of a medical provid-
er’s bill when the provider accepted as full payment, pursuant to a preex-
isting contract with the injured person’s health insurer, an amount less 
than the provider’s bill.89 The court ruled that the collateral source rule 
had no bearing because the differential between the amount billed and 
the amount accepted as full payment were not damages the plaintiff 
would have otherwise collected from the defendant.90 
                                                        
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Hanif v. Hous. Auth., 246 Cal. Rptr. 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
 82. Howell, 257 P.3d at 1134. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1133. 
 90. Id. 
2014] Reforming Write-Offs in Washington State 1381 
The Howell court began its analysis with an earlier California ap-
pellate court case, Hanif v. Housing Authority.91 In Hanif, the state insur-
ance program, Medi-Cal, allegedly paid less than the reasonable value of 
the plaintiff’s medical treatment.92 The plaintiff’s medical providers then 
wrote off the difference between what it billed and what it was paid by 
Medi-Cal.93 While the trial court awarded the plaintiff the larger “reason-
able value” amount, the appellate court held that the trial court overcom-
pensated the plaintiff for his past medical expenses, and recovery should 
have been limited to the amount Medi-Cal had actually paid on the plain-
tiff’s behalf.94 
The Hanif court reasoned that reasonable value is a term of limita-
tion, not aggrandizement.95 The Hanif court also found that the only “det-
riment” or pecuniary “loss” suffered by the plaintiff was what Medi-Cal 
had paid on his behalf, and to award him more was to place him in a bet-
ter financial position than he was in before the tort was committed.96 
Hanif, therefore, limited a tort plaintiff’s recovery to the amount paid or 
incurred for past medical care and services whether it was paid by the 
plaintiff or by an independent source.97 
Hanif and the California courts’ earlier decisions, however, did not 
discuss the central arguments before the court in Howell; namely, wheth-
er restricting recovery to amounts actually paid by a plaintiff or on his or 
her behalf contravenes the collateral source rule.98 The Howell court re-
duced the arguments to four central disputed issues: 
(1) Was Hanif correct that a tort plaintiff can recover only what has 
been paid or incurred for medical care, even if that is less than the 
reasonable value of the services rendered? (2) Even if Hanif, which 
involved Medi-Cal payments, reached the right result on its facts, 
does its logic extend to plaintiffs covered by private insurance? (3) 
Does limiting the plaintiff’s recovery to the amounts paid and owed 
on his or her behalf confer a windfall on the tortfeasor, defeating the 
policy goals of the collateral source rule? (4) Is the difference be-
tween the providers’ full billings and the amounts they have agreed 
to accept from a patient’s insurer as full payment—what the appel-
late court below called the “negotiated rate differential”—a benefit 
                                                        
 91. Hanif v. Hous. Auth., 246 Cal. Rptr. 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
 92. Id. at 194. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 197. 
 95. Id. at 195. 
 96. Id. at 194–95. 
 97. Id. at 195. 
 98. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2011). 
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the patient receives from his or her health insurance policy subject 
to the collateral source rule?99 
The Howell court agreed with Hanif that a plaintiff may recover as 
economic damages no more than the reasonable value of the medical 
services received and is not entitled to recover the reasonable value if her 
actual loss was less.100 A plaintiff could not recover more than his actual 
loss because under California law, a medical expense had to be incurred 
to be recoverable.101 The Howell court relied in part on §§ 3281 and 3282 
of the California Civil Code, which provide that a plaintiff cannot recov-
er for a service that might have reasonably been charged if she negotiated 
a discount.102 The court reasoned that the same rule applies when the 
plaintiff’s health insurer has obtained a discount.103 
The Howell court noted that the Restatement rule had the same ef-
fect.104 The Restatement specifies that the measure of recovery for the 
costs of services that a third party renders is ordinarily the reasonable 
value of those services; if a person paid less than the exchange rate, then 
he can recover no more than the amount paid, except when the low rate 
was intended as a gift.105 And while the expenses of medical care are not 
specifically mentioned in § 911 of the Restatement, the court found that 
they were logically included in the rule articulated.106 The Howell court 
also found that § 924 of the Restatement—which provides that medical 
and other expenses must be reasonable—did not alter the general rule 
that the expense must be incurred.107 
The Howell court found Hanif’s limitation of recovery for Medi-
Cal recipients applied to plaintiffs with private medical insurance.108 The 
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that she incurred liability for the 
full amount of her medical providers’ bills when she signed their patient 
agreements and accepted their services.109 Because of the preexisting 
agreement between her health insurer and the medical providers, the 
court reasoned it could not meaningfully be said that the plaintiff ever 
                                                        
 99. Id. at 1137. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3281, 3282 (1872). 
 103. See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1138. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 911. cmt. h (1979). 
 106. Howell, 257 P.3d at 1138.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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incurred the full charges.110 As in Hanif, the plaintiff in Howell bore no 
personal responsibility for the providers’ charges.111 
One exception noted in Hanif is that a plaintiff could recover for 
medical services gratuitously provided or discounted by his medical care 
providers.112 This exception—that the collateral source rule applies to 
gratuitous payments and services—is supported by the Restatement.113 
The rationale for the exception is to encourage charitable action and pre-
clude a tortfeasor from gaining the benefit of charity.114 The exception 
raises the question that if the amount of gratuitous discount is considered 
a collateral source payment, should the amount of a negotiated discount 
be treated the same way? 
The Howell court found that the exception for gratuitous discounts 
did not apply to medical providers who agreed to accept discounted 
payment because they did so “not as a gift to the patient or insurer, but 
for commercial reasons as a result of negotiations.”115 The agreement 
guarantees prompt payment along with other administrative and market-
ing advantages.116 Additionally, there is no danger the agreements will 
disappear if plaintiffs are not allowed to recover the full amount billed 
because medical providers have no financial reason to care if plaintiffs 
recover the negotiated rate differential.117 
The Howell court determined that a tortfeasor does not obtain a 
“windfall” because the injured party’s health insurer negotiated a favora-
ble rate of payment with the medical provider.118 The rationale behind 
not allowing a tortfeasor to deduct from damages the benefits received 
from a collateral source or gift is that a tortfeasor would not be paying 
the full cost of her negligence or wrongdoing, which would distort the 
deterrence function of tort law.119 The court found that this rationale did 
not apply to a plaintiff only paying the discounted price negotiated by a 
health insurer because of the complexities of pricing and reimbursement 
patterns for medical providers.120 
The Howell court relied, in part, on the observation that because so 
many patients—insured, uninsured, and recipients under government 
health care programs—pay discounted rates, hospital bills have been 
                                                        
 110. Id. at 1138–39. 
 111. Id. at 1139. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A. cmt. c(3) (1979). 
 114. Id. at 1140. 
 115. Howell, 257 P.3d at 1139–40. 
 116. Id. at 1140. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1141. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
1384 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:1371 
called “insincere, in the sense that they would yield truly enormous prof-
its if those prices were actually paid.”121 The court noted that it is not 
possible to say generally that medical providers’ full bills represent the 
real value of their services, nor that the discounted payments they accept 
from private insurers are mere arbitrary reductions.122 “Accordingly, a 
tortfeasor who pays only the discounted amount of damages does not 
generally receive a windfall and is not generally undeterred from engag-
ing in risky conduct.”123 
Finally, the Howell court determined that the negotiated rate differ-
ential was not a benefit accruing to the plaintiff under her policy for 
which she paid premiums.124 The Howell court noted that health insurers 
and medical providers negotiate rates in pursuit of their own business 
interests and that the benefits of the bargains made accrue directly to 
them, with the primary benefit going to the medical insurer.125 In addi-
tion, the negotiated rate differential did not necessarily reflect the com-
mercial advantage the medical providers obtained in exchange for ac-
cepting a discounted payment in a particular case.126 In other words, the 
global value of the negotiated rate to the medical provider cannot be 
equated to the plaintiff’s individual case. 
The Howell court ruled that where a medical care provider accepted 
as full payment a sum less than the provider’s full bill, then it is evidence 
of the amount paid that is relevant at trial to prove the plaintiff’s damag-
es.127 Evidence that the medical bills were paid by an insurer would re-
main inadmissible under the collateral source rule.128 The effect of the 
Howell court’s ruling is that evidence of the full-billed amount is not it-
self relevant on the issue of past medical expense where the provider has 
by prior agreement accepted less than the billed amount.129 The Howell 
court, however, expressed no opinion about the relevance or admissibil-
ity of the full-billed amount on other issues such as noneconomic dam-
ages of future medical expenses.130 
In Corenbaum v. Lampkin, the California Court of Appeals picked 
up where the Howell court left off and concluded that evidence of the full 
amount billed for the plaintiff’s medical care was not relevant to the 
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amount of damages for past medical services, damages for future medi-
cal care, or noneconomic damages.131 In Corenbaum, the plaintiffs suf-
fered serious injuries in a motor vehicle accident while they were pas-
sengers in a taxicab.132 The plaintiffs brought separate actions against the 
defendant, which were consolidated before trial.133 Prior to the May 2011 
jury trial, the plaintiffs filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence 
of the payment of plaintiffs’ medical bills by a collateral source.134 The 
defendant requested a post-verdict hearing in the event that the jury ver-
dict included damages for past medical expenses in an amount exceeding 
the amount paid for those medical services.135 
In accordance with the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine, 
the jury heard evidence of the full amount billed for the plaintiffs’ medi-
cal care and heard no evidence of the lesser amounts accepted by their 
medical providers as full payment pursuant to prior agreement with the 
plaintiffs’ private insurers.136 The jury returned a verdict on June 3, 2011, 
awarding the plaintiffs past and future economic damages and noneco-
nomic damages.137 The defendant’s June 24, 2011 motion to reduce the 
compensatory damage awards was continued to August 23, 2011, and 
then to September 6, 2011.138 On July 5, 2011, the trial court entered 
separate judgments against the defendant, and on August 17, 2011, the 
trial court denied the defendant’s motions for a new trial and for a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of punitive damages.139 
The next day, on August 18, 2011, the California court filed its 
opinion in Howell.140 The Corenbaum trial court subsequently denied the 
defendant’s motion to reduce the compensatory damage awards on Sep-
tember 6, 2011, finding it did not have jurisdiction to reduce the awards 
because it had already denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial.141 
The defendant appealed, contending the trial court erred by admitting 
evidence of the full amount billed for plaintiffs’ medical care when the 
amounts accepted by their medical providers as full payment were less 
than the amounts billed.142 
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After considering the reasoning in Howell, the Corenbaum court 
held that evidence of the full amount billed for a plaintiff’s medical care 
is not relevant to the determination of a plaintiff’s damages for past med-
ical expenses and is therefore inadmissible for that purpose if the plain-
tiffs’ medical providers, by prior agreement, had contracted to accept a 
lesser amount as full payment for the services provided.143 
The Corenbaum court rejected the argument that a plaintiff seeking 
damages for past medical expenses should be able to present evidence of 
not only the amount accepted as full payment for past medical services 
provided, but also the reasonable value of those services.144 The court 
rejected this argument because a plaintiff can recover as damages no 
more than the amount incurred for past medical services; therefore, evi-
dence of the reasonable value of said services that exceed the amount 
paid is irrelevant and inadmissible.145 The court also noted that the evi-
dence would likely confuse the jury, suggest the existence of a collateral 
source of payment, and lead to a showing that the lesser amount was ne-
gotiated and paid by the plaintiffs’ health insurers.146 
The Corenbaum court then held that the full amount billed for past 
medical services is not relevant to the amount of future medical expenses 
and thus inadmissible for that purpose.147 The court relied upon the 
statement in Howell that the full amount billed is not an accurate measure 
of the value of medical services: “a medical provider’s billed price for 
particular services is not necessarily representative of either the cost of 
providing those services or their market value.”148 The court also deter-
mined that for a jury to consider evidence of the amount accepted as full 
payment, for the purpose of determining the amount of past economic 
damages, and the full amount billed, for some other purpose, would most 
certainly cause jury confusion and suggest the existence of a collateral 
source payment.149 
The Corenbaum court further held that any expert who testified on 
remand with respect to the reasonable value of future medical services 
the plaintiffs are reasonably likely to require may not rely on the full 
amounts billed for the plaintiffs’ past medical expenses.150 The court 
concluded that evidence of the full amount billed cannot support an ex-
pert opinion or the reasonable value of future medical services because 
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the full amount billed for past medical services is not relevant to the val-
ue of those services and that expert opinion based on speculation or con-
jecture is inadmissible.151 In addition, expert testimony based on the full 
amount billed would lead to the introduction of evidence concerning the 
lower negotiated price, thus violating the evidentiary aspect of the collat-
eral source rule.152 
The Corenbaum court also held that evidence of the full amount 
billed is not relevant to the amount of noneconomic damages.153 The 
court noted that the determination of noneconomic damages was subjec-
tive and committed to the discretion of the trier of fact.154 The court ob-
served that lawyers have used the amount of economic damages as a 
point of reference in their arguments to juries as a means to help deter-
mine the amount of noneconomic damages.155 The court, however, found 
the practice could provide no justification for the admission of evidence 
that is otherwise irrelevant and inadmissible.156 Accordingly, the court 
concluded evidence of the full amount billed is inadmissible for purposes 
of proving noneconomic damages.157 
The dissenting opinion in Howell proposed a third alternative: evi-
dence of payment, including acceptance of a lesser amount, is barred by 
the collateral source rule, and when a medical provider, by prior agree-
ment, accepts less than the full billed amount as full payment, then evi-
dence of the full billed amount is not relevant and inadmissible on the 
issue of past medical expenses.158 Under this third alternative, a plaintiff 
could recover the reasonable value or market value of medical services 
as determined by expert testimony at trial.159 
The dissent agreed that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover the gross 
amount of potentially inflated medical bills, but it rejected a bright-line 
rule limiting recovery to no more than the amount medical providers ac-
cepted in full payment for their services.160 The dissent believed such a 
limitation left an insured plaintiff in a worse position than an uninsured 
plaintiff.161 The dissent, however, did not consider the impact that a sub-
rogation clause has on a plaintiff’s recovery. The dissent further believed 
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that an insured individual purchased “not only indemnity coverage but 
also access to the negotiated discounts between her health insurer” and 
medical providers.162 Therefore, an uninsured individual is entitled to 
retain any difference between the reasonable value of her treatment and 
the lesser amount the providers agreed to accept as payment in full.163 
The dissent also failed to address a plaintiff’s recovery when she had no 
choice but to pay more than the reasonable value of the medical services 
received. 
The dissent observed that the majority of states follow § 924 of the 
Restatement Second of Torts, which permits plaintiffs to seek the rea-
sonable value of their expenses without limitation to the amount that they 
pay or that third parties pay on their behalf.164 The dissent believed that 
permitting recovery for the reasonable value of medical services is the 
fairest approach because to do otherwise would create separate catego-
ries of plaintiffs based on the method used to finance medical expens-
es.165 The dissent did not acknowledge that the method used to finance 
medical expenses dictated the amount of those medical expenses. 
The dissent believed both the original medical bill rendered and the 
amount accepted as full payment should be admissible to prove the rea-
sonable value of a plaintiff’s medical care.166 “The jury may decide that 
the reasonable value of medical care is the amount originally billed, the 
amount the medical provider accepted as payment, or some amount in 
between.”167 The jury would weigh the evidence and determine the rea-
sonable value of treatment with the help of expert opinion testimony.168 
In McConnell v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., a Nevada district court re-
jected the Howell court’s ruling that a medical provider accepting less 
than the full amount billed pursuant to a preexisting contract is not the 
forgiveness of a debt.169 The court predicted that the dissenting opinion 
in Howell accurately reflected how the Nevada Supreme Court would 
address the issue.170 Accordingly, the court ruled: 
[The] defendant may attempt to prove at trial that the amounts billed 
by Plaintiff’s medical providers were unreasonable in-and-of them-
selves—assuming Defendant has experts to provide such testimo-
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ny—but Defendant may not under the collateral source rule argue 
that any amount written down is necessarily unreasonable by the 
very fact that the amount was written down.171 
The court apparently departed from the dissent in Howell on the admissi-
bility of the amount accepted as full payment. The court also did not rule 
on what facts the defendant’s expert witness could use to support his 
opinion. Finally, the court buttressed its ruling by stating it encouraged 
the purchase of insurance,172 although the primary beneficiaries under its 
ruling arguably are people on Medicaid. 
In Luttrell v. Island Pacific Supermarkets, Inc., a California appel-
late court held that “Howell governs where past medical expenses have 
been paid by Medicare, and the Howell cap should be imposed before 
any reduction for failure to mitigate damages.”173 And in Sanchez v. 
Brooke, a separate California appellate court held that an injured em-
ployee’s recovery is limited to amounts paid to medical providers by 
one’s employer under workers’ compensation law.174 
California’s recent leading decision on write-offs provides a juris-
prudential framework for a Washington could revisit its application of 
the collateral source rule. Whether Washington should amend its applica-
tion per Howell’s majority opinion or dissent will be further discussed. 
But first, reviewing the current political and economic environment sur-
rounding tort reform and the collateral source rule is pivotal. 
IV. FROM MICHIGAN TO PENNSYLVANIA: TORT REFORM, MEDICAL 
BILLING, AND THE DIFFERENCES IN STATE SUPREME COURT RULINGS 
When considering whether Washington should revisit Hayes v. 
Wieber Enterprises, Inc. and amend its application of the collateral 
source rule, it is imperative to assess the current health care environment 
and reflect on how other state courts are ruling on write-offs per the col-
lateral source rule. This Part summarizes the overwhelming rise in cost 
of the original amount billed for medical services and how “reasonable-
ness” or “unreasonableness” is determined. This Part also explores the 
tort reform movement and how other states are modifying or maintaining 
their rulings on write-offs. Lastly, this Part examines contractual agree-
ments and, specifically, subrogation clauses. 
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A. Outrageous Medical Bills in the United States and                           
Determining Their “Reasonableness” 
In 1960, “there were no discounts, everyone paid the same rates” 
for medical care, which was usually the actual cost of the medical care 
plus 10%.175 The rise of managed care organizations, which typically 
restrict payments for services to their members, has led to increases in 
the prices charged to uninsured patients, who do not benefit from provid-
ers’ contracts with the plans.176 As some insurers demanded deep dis-
counting, hospitals vigorously “shifted costs to patients with less 
clout.”177 “Some physicians, too, have reportedly shifted costs to the un-
insured, resulting in significant disparities between charges to uninsured 
patients and those with private insurance or public medical benefits.”178 
As a consequence of shifting costs, “[o]nly uninsured, self-paying 
U.S. patients have been billed the full charges listed in hospitals’ inflated 
chargemasters.”179 A chargemaster is an internal price list that every hos-
pital uses, although no hospital’s chargemaster prices are consistent with 
those of any other hospital.180 Insurers negotiate prices by a percentage 
above the Medicare rates or below the chargemaster price.181 Stamford 
Hospital spokesman Scott Orstad commented, “[V]ery few people actu-
ally pay [chargemaster] rates.”182 However, due to the collateral source 
rule applying to write-offs, defendants are required to pay this original 
invoiced amount for the medical services provided before the insured 
discounted price. 
For example, a California family might find itself “paying off over 
many years a hospital bill of, say, $30,000 for a procedure that Medicaid 
would have reimbursed at only $6,000 and commercial insurers some-
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where in between.”183 As explained in Howell’s majority opinion, “be-
cause so many patients, insured, uninsured, and recipients under gov-
ernment health care programs, pay discounted rates, hospital bills have 
been called ‘insincere, in the sense that they would yield truly enormous 
profits if those prices were actually paid.’”184 
According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, the portion of the 
economy devoted to health care has risen steadily for at least fifty years, 
rising from 5.2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1960 to 17.9% of 
GDP in 2010.185 In only the last ten years, U.S. spending on health care 
doubled, from $1.3 trillion to $2.6 trillion a year, which is suspected to 
reach $4.6 trillion in 2020.186 In addition, the Center for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS) estimates that nearly one-fifth (19.8%) of 
GDP will be devoted to health care by the year 2020.187 This amounts to 
per capita spending on health care that exceeds $13,000 a year.188 This is 
thousands more spent than any other developed or industrialized coun-
try.189 
Health care costs associated with medical services are slated to rise 
drastically during the next ten years,190 which will have serious implica-
tions for write-offs because as health care costs rise chargemaster prices 
will undoubtedly become even more inflated. The question is whether 
Washington should continue accepting the original amount billed as 
“reasonable” when it is inflated and rarely paid. 
1. Assessing “Reasonableness” 
The amount accepted by the medical provider as payment in full is 
by definition the market value of the services provided. This is the 
amount negotiated by a willing buyer to a willing seller, i.e., the 
amount a private health insurance company or government agency 
agreed to pay a medical provider for a particular service. These types of 
agreements were unknown in 1914 when the court in Torgeson v. Han-
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ford held a plaintiff had to establish he paid the reasonable value of med-
ical services. People no longer travel by horse and buggy, and the 
amount paid for medical services is no longer determined by an agree-
ment between patient and provider. Instead, as noted above, a hospital’s 
chargemaster determines the invoiced price of all medical services.191 
Chargemaster prices are not based on anything objective, and as noted by 
Brill, “[w]ere set in cement a long time ago and just keep going up al-
most automatically.”192 
The invoiced price is simply the beginning figure in a transaction 
process, and it can be argued that the amount accepted as payment in full 
represents the reasonable value of those services. A defendant seeking to 
limit recovery to the amount accepted as payment in full would not be 
arguing that a plaintiff may not recover for medical bills paid by a collat-
eral source. Rather, the defendant would be arguing that a plaintiff may 
only recover the full amount of her medical costs—not the amount billed. 
For example, three CT scans at Yale New Haven Health System cost an 
insured patient $6,538, but Medicare would have only paid $825 for all 
three.193 “By law, Medicare’s payments approximate a hospital’s cost of 
providing a service, including overhead, equipment, and salaries.”194 In 
this instance, Medicare’s payment could be seen as the “reasonable” cost 
of the service—not the amount initially billed.  
The above argument is similar to a case recently decided in Penn-
sylvania. In Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Medical Center, the appellant’s 
decedent fell and injured herself, requiring medical services provided by 
the appellee.195 The appellant was covered under Medicare as well as a 
“Blue Cross 65” supplemental plan, for which she paid premiums.196 The 
“fair and reasonable value” of the medical services rendered to the appel-
lant was $108,668, but Medicare’s allowance for those services was 
$12,167.197 The issue on appeal was whether the appellant was entitled to 
collect the additional amount of $96,501 as an expense even though the 
appellant did not pay the $96,501, nor did Medicare or Blue Cross 65 
pay that amount on her behalf.198 The court affirmed that Pennsylvania 
case law allows a plaintiff to recover the reasonable value of medical 
services.199 However, the court held that the collateral source rule did not 
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apply to the illusory charge of $96,501 because that amount was not paid 
by any collateral source.200 
Another example is from the Indiana Supreme Court where in But-
ler v. Indiana Department of Insurance, the plaintiff filed a claim for 
medical negligence against Clarian Health Partners, Inc. and several in-
dividual health care providers.201 The plaintiff died before the claim was 
resolved, but her estate continued with the claim and later settled with 
Clarian.202 The plaintiff’s estate also proceeded with its claim against the 
other insurer, the Indiana Patient Compensation Fund (Fund).203 The 
Fund sought partial summary judgment, claiming the plaintiff’s estate 
was entitled to recovery, but only for the expenses the plaintiff actually 
incurred for medical services and not the total amount of medical bills 
received.204 
The Fund relied on its interpretation of Indiana Code § 34-23-1-1, 
which governs actions for the wrongful death of unmarried adult persons 
without dependents. The court held: 
With respect to damages pursuant to Indiana Code § 34-23-1-
2(c)(3)(A), when medical providers provide statements of charges 
for health care services to the decedent but thereafter accept a re-
duced amount adjusted due to contractual arrangements with the in-
surers or government benefit providers, in full satisfaction the 
charges, the amount recoverable under the statute for the 
‘[r]easonable medical . . . expenses necessitated’ by the wrongful 
act is the portion of the billed charges ultimately accepted pursuant 
to such contractual adjustments.205 
And in Kastick v. U-Haul Co. of Western Michigan, the plaintiff 
was making a left turn from State Route 38 into his daughter’s driveway 
in the city of Auburn when a U-Haul truck leased by the defendant struck 
his vehicle on the driver’s side.206 The plaintiff was unable to take in 
enough oxygen due to his injuries and became dependent on a respira-
tor.207 The plaintiff died only five months after the accident.208 The New 
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, stated the following:  
Defendants contend that plaintiff may not recover from them an 
amount for which she never became obligated. We agree with de-
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fendants. Although the write-off technically is not a payment from a 
collateral source . . . it is not an item of damages for which plaintiff 
may recover because plaintiff has incurred no liability.209 
Not all state courts use similar reasoning; for example, the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court did not permit the amount paid to be accepted as the 
recovery under the reasonable expense doctrine—even though the plain-
tiff, like in Kastick, incurred no liability for the full amount billed. In 
Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., the plaintiff was injured at a construction site 
and brought a personal injury action against the property owner, subcon-
tractor, health insurer, and liability insurers.210 The plaintiff’s health care 
provider billed the plaintiff $154,819 for the treatment of her injuries 
caused by the defendant’s negligent actions, but as a result of the negoti-
ated discounts, the health care provider accepted $111,395 from the 
plaintiff’s insurance company.211 This amounted to a difference of 
$43,424.212 Since the jury awards the “reasonable value” of the plaintiff’s 
medical treatment, the defendant argued that the collateral source rule 
should not apply because the jury should know the amount the plaintiff’s 
health insurance company actually paid for the medical treatment, not the 
amount billed, as that would aid in their computation of what the reason-
able value of the medical treatment was.213 
The court held that “the collateral source rule prohibits parties in a 
personal injury action from introducing evidence of the amount actually 
paid by . . . a collateral source for medical treatment rendered to prove 
the reasonable value of the medical treatment.”214 To reach its conclu-
sion, the court reasoned that it “might bring complex, confusing side is-
sues before the fact-finder that are not necessarily related to the value of 
the medical services rendered.”215 In addition, the court explained that 
one issue of confusion would be the reimbursement rate because it was 
decided based on the contractual agreement between the plaintiff and his 
insurance carrier, and is not solely based on the reasonable value of med-
ical services.216 The cost of the plaintiff’s medical treatment, therefore, 
would vary depending on different contractual agreements. 
The court’s ruling in Leitinger is similar to the South Carolina Su-
preme Court decision in Covington v. George. In Covington, the defend-
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ant rear-ended the plaintiff when the plaintiff stopped for a school bus.217 
The defendant admitted his liability for the accident but contested the 
amount of damages.218 The plaintiff was billed $1,430 for services per-
formed after the accident, but the health care provider accepted $277 as 
full payment for the services.219 The plaintiff was then billed $1,969 for 
additional services and the health care provider again accepted the lower 
rate of $371 with $58 still owed.220 The defendant sought to introduce 
evidence of the actual payment accepted by the health care provider in 
order to challenge the “reasonableness of the medical expenses sought by 
the plaintiff.”221 
According to the court, a tortfeasor cannot “take advantage of a 
contract between an injured party and a third person, no matter whether 
the source of the funds received is ‘an insurance company, an employer, 
a family member, or other source.’”222 The court held that while the de-
fendant was permitted to attack the “necessity and reasonableness” of the 
medical care and costs, the defendant could not do so by utilizing evi-
dence of payments made by a collateral source.223 
Some states, moreover, are aware of the windfall of benefits associ-
ated with the adherence to the collateral source rule and still permit the 
plaintiff’s double recovery. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court 
recently reaffirmed the collateral source rule in Acuar v. Letourneau by 
stating, 
A plaintiff who receives a double recovery for a single tort enjoys a 
windfall; a defendant who escapes, in whole or in part, liability for 
his wrong enjoys a windfall. Because the law must sanction one 
windfall and deny the other, it favors the victim of the wrong rather 
than the wrongdoer.224 
As previously discussed, states differ on their application of the col-
lateral source rule, with one extreme being New Hampshire. New Hamp-
shire has eliminated the collateral source rule—including to allow the 
introduction of evidence of government benefits such as Medicare, Med-
icaid, or Social Security.225 This frustration is exemplified in the court’s 
opinion in Gordon v. Forsyth County Hospital Authority, Inc., where the 
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judge noted, “it would be unconscionable to permit the taxpayers to bear 
the expense of providing free medical care to a person and then allow 
that person to recover damages for medical services from a tort-feasor 
and pocket the windfall.”226 
When confronted with the issue of ruling on the reasonableness of 
write-offs, state courts have either maintained their coverage under the 
collateral source rule or held the defendant should only be responsible 
for the actual amount paid. In connection with the rising cost of the orig-
inal amount billed for medical services, the current tort reform environ-
ment encourages modification of the collateral source rule. 
Washington should abolish its requirement that a plaintiff 
must establish that the amount paid for past medical expenses was rea-
sonable when the plaintiff or a third party has paid the market value of 
the services provided. While the requirement might have made sense 
when it was adopted in Torgeson v. Hanford in 1914, its continued use is 
unwarranted because medical bills are no longer agreements be-
tween plaintiffs and providers. The requirement is also impractical. The 
reasonableness of medical expenses can be established by the testimony 
of the medical provider. This is how the plaintiff in Hayes established the 
reasonableness of the full amount billed for the services provided to her. 
Has a medical provider in Washington ever testified that the amount she 
billed was not reasonable? 
B. How Does Tort Reform Impact the Write-Offs and the Collateral 
Source Rule? 
The tort reform movement has actively targeted the collateral 
source rule and focused on preventing the overcompensation of plain-
tiffs. In a 2006 survey of state statutes exploring the collateral source 
rule, Professors David Schap and Andrew Feeley discovered the follow-
ing: 
[Thirty-eight] states modified the rule in some form to allow the in-
troduction of collateral source evidence in medical liability cases. 
Twenty states permitted consideration of collateral source offsets 
during trial, while [fourteen] states required consideration of such 
offsets after the judgment or award. Six states required the offset to 
be taken after the jury’s verdict but before entry of judgment by the 
court.227 
The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) “supports permit-
ting the admissibility of evidence of collateral source payments at trial or 
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requiring awards to be offset by the amount paid to plaintiffs by collat-
eral sources, less the amount paid by the plaintiff to secure the bene-
fit.”228 The ATRA supports eliminating the collateral source rule specifi-
cally because it prevents relevant information used to determine damages 
from reaching the jury, and it allows the plaintiffs to be compensated 
twice for the same injury.229 
In addition, the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons 
(AAOS) issued a position statement supporting the enactment of federal 
tort reform legislation, including, but not limited to, a specific cap on 
noneconomic damages and mandatory offset of collateral sources of 
payment.230 The AAOS argued that allowing plaintiffs to recover the un-
discounted price for medical services when there is ample evidence to 
show that they paid less will have the net effect of increasing societal 
costs through higher insurance premiums.231 
Would tort reform laws, such as one modifying the collateral source 
rule, have a substantial impact on lowering health care costs in Washing-
ton? Because Washington is one of the few states that modified its col-
lateral source rule in medical liability cases, modifying the collateral 
source rule would most likely not have an impact on health care costs. 
The Revised Code of Washington (RCW) § 7.70.080 supersedes the 
common law collateral source rule in regards to health care lawsuits. Un-
der this statute, 
Any party may present evidence to the trier of fact that the plaintiff 
has already been compensated for the injury complained of from 
any source except the assets of the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s repre-
sentative, or the plaintiff’s immediate family. In the event such evi-
dence is admitted, the plaintiff may present evidence of an obliga-
tion to repay such compensation and evidence of any amount paid 
by the plaintiff, or his or her representative or immediate family, to 
secure the right to the compensation. Compensation as used in this 
section shall mean payment of money or other property to or on be-
half of the plaintiff, rendering of services to the plaintiff free of 
charge to the plaintiff, or indemnification of expenses incurred by or 
on behalf of the plaintiff. Notwithstanding this section, evidence of 
compensation by a defendant health care provider may be offered 
only by that provider.232 
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The statute clearly establishes that in medical malpractice actions, either 
party can introduce evidence that a plaintiff has already been compen-
sated from a third party, such as an insurance payout.233 
Dr. Glenn D. Braunstein, chairman of the Department of Medicine 
at Cedars-Sinai, specifically addressed whether medical malpractice and 
tort reform would have an effect on total health care costs. Dr. 
Braunstein contends that the “direct costs in 2009 to providers of medical 
malpractice liability insurance, costs including insurance premiums, set-
tlements, awards and administrative costs, totaled $35 billion, according 
to the Congressional Budget Office.”234 Therefore, even “if those costs 
were reduced by 10 percent, it would only reduce the national health ex-
penditures by 0.2 percent. Even if reforms resulted in less use of health 
care services driven by fear of lawsuits, savings to the system would be 
about 0.5 percent or $11 billion in 2009.”235 This malpractice reform 
proposal would not limit awards for victims, but it would allow doctors 
to use a “safe harbor defense.”236 Under a safe harbor defense, a defend-
ant doctor or hospital can argue that the care it provided was within “the 
bounds of what peers have established as reasonable under the circum-
stances.”237 
Dr. Braunstein, however, notes that tort reform could save the fed-
eral government’s Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health insur-
ance programs $54 billion over ten years, or $5.4 billion annually.238 Ob-
viously, tort reform would have an effect on health care costs, but when 
it currently costs $2.6 trillion239 per year, the claim that tort reform would 
substantially reduce the government’s cost is arguably unsubstantiated. 
C. Contractual Agreements and Subrogation Clauses: The Argument 
Many states distinguish between collateral source payments made 
by a private third party, such as personal health insurance, and those 
made by a public source, such as Medicaid, Medicare, or Social Security. 
This is because a plaintiff with private insurance has a prior contractual 
agreement with the insurance company, i.e., the plaintiff may have bar-
gained for a specific rate and has paid into the insurance. This is different 
from public sources of insurance because public sources are not paid by a 
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plaintiff or bargained for between a plaintiff and the plaintiff’s employer; 
instead, they are based on federal eligibility guidelines.240 Thus, these 
“write-offs” between the plaintiff’s damages and the amount paid 
through a public source are “phantom” benefits awarded to the plain-
tiff.241 
This application of the collateral source rule is made in Tucker v. 
Volunteers of America Colorado Branch. In Tucker, the plaintiff-invitee 
brought a premises liability action against the defendant landowner, Vol-
unteers of America Colorado Branch.242 The district court reduced the 
plaintiff’s award by the difference between the full amount of his medi-
cal bills and the amount paid by his medical insurer.243 The Colorado 
Court of Appeals concluded that the contract between the plaintiff’s in-
surer and plaintiff’s health care providers, which decreased the amount 
actually paid for his medical care, inured to his benefit and fell within the 
contractual exception to Colorado’s collateral source rule, codified in the 
Colorado Revised Statute § 13-21-111.6.244 The Colorado Supreme Court 
affirmed when it stated the following statutory interpretation: 
In any action by any person or his legal representative to recover 
damages for a tort resulting in death or injury to person or property, 
the court, after the finder of fact has returned its verdict stating the 
amount of damages to be awarded, shall reduce the amount of the 
verdict by the amount by which such person, his estate, or his per-
sonal representative has been or will be wholly or partially indemni-
fied or compensated for his loss by any other person, corporation, 
insurance company, or fund in relation to the injury, damage, or 
death sustained; except that the verdict shall not be reduced by the 
amount by which such person, his estate, or his personal representa-
tive has been or will be wholly or partially indemnified or compen-
sated by a benefit paid as a result of a contract entered into and paid 
for by or on behalf of such person. The court shall enter judgment 
on such reduced amount.245 
The court clarified that this statute requires trial courts to set off any 
payment received by a tort plaintiff, his estate, or personal representative 
that was intended to indemnify or compensate such plaintiffs; however, it 
exempts this setoff if the payment was made “as a result of a contract 
entered into and paid for by or on behalf of such person.”246 Thus, the 
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court concluded that the contract between plaintiff’s insurer and the 
health care providers, which decreased the amount actually paid for 
plaintiff’s medical care, resulted in plaintiff’s benefit and falls within the 
contract exception outlined in the statute.247 
And in Windsor School District v. State, the plaintiff school district 
sued the state of Vermont and the Vermont Department of Corrections 
for expenses related to an environmental cleanup of school district prop-
erty formerly owned by the state.248 On appeal, the Department of Cor-
rections argued that the trial court erroneously invoked the collateral 
source rule when it declined to reduce the plaintiff’s damages by the 
amount it had been paid by its insurance company, which was acknowl-
edged to be in excess of $470,000.249 The main basis of this argument 
was that because the Department of Corrections gave grants to the plain-
tiff under applicable state aid, “the insurance policies from which [the 
plaintiff] received payments were not a source ‘wholly independent from 
the defendants.’”250 
The court disagreed with the Department of Corrections because 
even though it may have subsidized the operating expenses of the school 
district, it could not definitively state that the insurance was purchased 
because of the subsidization.251 The court agreed with the trial court that 
the plaintiff’s insurance proceeds were a collateral source and, under the 
collateral source rule, the state’s liability could not be reduced by the 
amount the plaintiff received from its insurance company.252 
However, in Papke v. Harbert, where the plaintiff filed a medical 
malpractice suit as a result of both her legs being amputated,253 the South 
Dakota Supreme Court prohibited evidence of the amount paid by public 
sources as payment in full for the plaintiff’s medical care. The plaintiff 
was billed $429,531 for her medical care; Medicare paid $79,412 and 
Medicaid paid $133,874.254 “The remaining $216,874.03 was written off 
and will never be paid by anyone.”255 The defendants argued that the 
plaintiff’s right to recover the “reasonable value” of medical services as a 
measure of damages does not include amounts “written off” by the medi-
cal care provider because of a contractual agreement between the provid-
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er, Medicare, and Medicaid.256 The court nevertheless held that when 
establishing the reasonable value of medical services, defendants in 
South Dakota are prohibited from introducing evidence that a plaintiff’s 
award should be reduced because of a benefit received wholly independ-
ent of the defendant.257 The court readily admitted that this might result 
in a “windfall to the injured plaintiff,” but that it is better than letting a 
“windfall go to an injured party [rather] than to a tortfeasor.”258 
Subrogation Clauses 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines subrogation as “the principle under 
which an insurer that has paid a loss under an insurance policy is entitled 
to all the rights and remedies belonging to the insured against a third par-
ty with respect to any loss covered by the policy.”259 Subrogation gives 
an insurer the opportunity to recover the value of the benefits once paid 
to the plaintiff.260 Upon payment for a loss, an insurer’s right to subro-
gate arises, assuming that the right has not been waived by contract or 
conduct, or extinguished by applicable state or federal laws.261 Under the 
“make whole doctrine,” an insurer generally cannot seek subrogation 
until the insured has been fully compensated for any compensable inju-
ries she sustained.262  
At one time, the collateral source rule may have commonly resulted 
in defendants receiving compensation from both their health insurer and 
a tortfeasor whenever the defendant had health insurance at the time of 
an injury. Today, however, private health insurance companies and gov-
ernment agencies seek reimbursement for the medical bills that have 
been paid through contractual subrogation or by statute.263 It has been 
only in the last 30 to 40 years that subrogation disputes regarding per-
sonal injury cases have arisen. “During this period, subrogation clauses 
have been inserted in first party medical payments coverage in automo-
bile policies, uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, and medical 
and hospitalization coverages.”264 
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In addition, Congress amended the Social Security Act in 1980 to 
add the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, which effectively created Medi-
care “liens.” Congress amended the Social Security Act again in 2003 to 
clarify its position that self-insured entities were included in the Medi-
care Secondary Payer Act. So after the 2003 amendment, it became clear 
that all third-party recoveries were subject to reimbursement on the Med-
icare Secondary Payer Act.265 
V. CONCLUSION 
The common law in Washington now permits recovery for medical 
expenses that were never incurred and have no relationship to their mar-
ket value. Washington, therefore, should amend the common law appli-
cation of the collateral source rule to disallow the recovery of write-offs. 
The common law in Washington was adopted when medical providers 
billed patients the same amount regardless of whether they were unin-
sured, had private insurance, or were covered by a government program, 
and when subrogation clauses were virtually unknown.  
Washington courts should adopt the California court’s ruling in 
Howell that an injured plaintiff whose medical expenses are paid by a 
private insurance plan can recover damages for past medical expenses in 
an amount no greater than the amount that the plaintiff’s medical provid-
ers, pursuant to prior agreement, accepted as full payment or, to the ex-
tent that payment is still owed, the amount that the medical providers 
have agreed to accept as full payment for the services provided.266 In 
short, the plaintiff may only recover the market value of the services 
provided. 
Disallowing the recovery of write-offs does not violate Washing-
ton’s collateral source rule, and it still permits a plaintiff to recover the 
reasonable value of necessary medical services caused by a defendant. 
The collateral source rule is not violated because evidence of payment 
remains inadmissible. The plaintiff is permitted to recover the reasonable 
value of the medical services provided because recovery is permitted for 
the market value of those services. After all, market value is the amount 
paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller. 
Write-offs would be eliminated if private health insurers and gov-
ernment agencies simply required medical care providers to bill only the 
amount the health insurer contracted to pay or the amount allowed by 
statute. Medical bills are elaborately coded, so it would be convenient for 
medical providers to only bill health insurers and government agencies 
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for the amount that they are contracted to pay or will pay by statute. This 
requirement would result in the full amount billed also being the amount 
paid on the plaintiff’s behalf. Adopting California’s ruling in How-
ell would preclude recovery for damages essentially caused by a billing 
procedure. 
Adopting the California court’s ruling in Howell would also ensure 
all plaintiffs full recovery for their injuries, preclude using injuries as 
economic opportunities, and reduce the cost of litigation. Allowing plain-
tiffs to recover the amount actually paid for medical services permits 
plaintiffs to recover the market value of the medical services received 
while avoiding the risk that a trier of fact might determine the reasonable 
value of the medical services was less than the amount paid because oth-
ers are billed less for the services provided to the plaintiffs. 
It is repugnant for certain plaintiffs to receive a greater recovery for 
the same injuries as other plaintiffs simply because they are on Medicaid 
and not covered by private insurance. Limiting recovery to the actual 
amount paid will undoubtedly have an impact on a jury’s determination 
of noneconomic damages, but plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover 
noneconomic damages based on an economic loss that they never in-
curred. 
Finally, allowing recovery for the amount actually paid avoids the 
cost of expert witnesses to battle the reasonable value of the medical ser-
vices received by plaintiffs, as suggested by the dissent in Howell—
particularly when the market value can be readily obtained by ascertain-
ing the amount actually paid for the medical services. In short, the trial 
court in Patterson v. Horton got it right. 
Washington’s adherence to laws that were handed down a century 
ago, mixed with modern medical billing practices that include rarely paid 
inflated invoices, has resulted in the recovery of medical expenses that 
were never incurred and have no relationship to their market value. 
Washington, therefore, should amend its common law application of the 
collateral source rule to disallow the recovery of write-offs. By amending 
its application, Washington would ensure that plaintiffs only recover the 
market value of medical services in a cost effective manner. 
